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lNsURANCE-lNsURABLE INTEREST-JOINT AnVENTURERs-Plaintiff and the
deceased were operating an airplane commercially. Plaintiff had purchased the
plane, and was paying the deceased $25 per week plus half of the profits of the
venture. The deceased acted as pilot, and was instrumental in obtaining business. Plaintiff took out insurance on the plane, and also on the life of the
deceased, although their only relationship was through the joint venture. The
plane was wrecked and the deceased was killed while on company business. The
claim for the plane was paid, but the defendant refused to pay on the life insurance
policy, claiming that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the life of the deceased. The case was submitted to a jury which found that the plaintiff had an
insurable interest. Defendant appealed. Held, affirmed. "It was not necessary to
prove that the death of the insured resulted in a substantial loss to the beneficiary.
. . . It is sufficient that the beneficiary has a reasonable expectation of some benefit
or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured."1 Indemnity Ins. Co.
of North America v. Dow,. (6th Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 168.
The law has long frowned upon life insurance policies in which the beneficiary
paid the premiums, but in which the beneficiary had no reason to hope for the
continued well being of the assured. A policy of this type is in the nature of a
wager, and since unscrupulous beneficiaries might seek a quick return, these policies are treated as void. 2 The question as to how much of an interest is required
to justify insurance on the life of another was answered in the leading case of
Warnock v. Davis3 as follows: "an insurable interest ... [is] such an interest ...
as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance •.. of the life of the assured. [The interest need not be] ... capable of pecuniary estimation." In the light of this rule the defendant's argument seemed quite
plausible. The plaintiff's only investment was in the plane itself. This was an
ordinary business venture, subject to all the vicissitudes of such an enterprise,
and moreover, the deceased was just an ordinary pilot, and replaceable. All the
plaintiff was doing was insuring the life of an ordinary employee.4 The court

Principal case at 170.
Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 32 S.Ct. 58 (1911).
104 U.S. 775 at 779, 26 L.Ed. 924 (1881).
4 "Accepting ••• the definition 0£ 'insurable interest' [in] Warnock v. Davis ... [that]
there must be reasonable grounds to expect some benefit or advantage ... I take it that
reasonable ground for such expectation means something more than merely a hope." Simons,
J. dissenting in the principal case at 170-171.
1
2
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found something more in the facts, however, for the deceased was widely known,
and well liked, and it was upon her shoulders that the success of the venture ultimately rested. The majority felt that if a jury could find an insurable interest
they would not disturb the verdict. It has long been recognized that a business
could insure the life of an employee when that employee was of such importance
to the organization that his death would certainly result in serious loss. 5 In this
respect the principal case follows the usual rule, and it is only of interest to show
the extent to which the concept of "a reasonable expectation of advantage or
benefit from the continuance .•. of the life of the assured" has been carried.
Surely any smaller interest in the plaintiff would compel a decision for the
defendant. The decision is illustrative of a trend that was noted more than thirty
years ago towards reducing the requirement of insurable interest. 6 It seems likely
that the trend will continue so long as juries are given the task of deciding on the
liability of insurance companies.
Alan P. Goldstein, S.Ed.

5 Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Board, Armstrong and Co., 115 Va. 836,
80 S.E. 565 (1914); Keckley v. The Coshocton Glass Co., 86 Ohio St. 213, 99 N.E. 299
(1912).
6 Patterson, "Insurable Interest in Life," 18 CoL. L. Rav. 381 (1918).

